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The effects of information asymmetry and government 
size on happiness: A case study from Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper uses individual-level data from Japan (2003) to examine the 
effects of government size and the disclosure of official government information on 
happiness. The major findings are as follows. (1) Disclosure of official information is 
positively associated with the happiness of workers, but not with that of non-workers. 
(2) Government size has a positive effect on the happiness of non-workers, but not with 
that of workers. Therefore, information asymmetry between government and citizens 
is thought to reduce the happiness of those who bear the cost of public service but does 
not affect the happiness of public service beneficiaries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990s, happiness research has been of major importance in the fields 
of economics and political economics (Di Tella et al., 2003; Frey & Stutzer, 2002; Scoppa 
& Ponzo, 2008). The numerous studies attempting to explore happiness have considered 
factors such as various political institutions as well as evaluating economic factors (Frey 
& Stutzer, 2000; Bjørnskov et al., 2010). It is widely acknowledged that government has 
a critical influence on social welfare1. There are, however, two conflicting views on the 
outcomes of government activities. First, from the viewpoint of neo-classical economics, 
government is considered to play an important role in alleviating market failure. 
Politicians are the agents of the citizens and they should therefore make an effort to 
serve the citizens‟ welfare. In an ideal polity, where principal (citizen) and agent 
(politician) share the same information, perfect competition among politicians drives 
„political profit‟ to zero. Political competitive pressure can be considered similar to 
competitive pressure in the market, leading to an increase in citizens‟ happiness. For 
instance, government provides the public goods that meet citizens‟ desires but cannot be 
provided by private suppliers in the market. Consequently, citizens are likely to feel 
happy due to the provision of public goods by government. Under political pressure, 
government size is anticipated to be optimal and maximize citizens‟ happiness; for 
instance, Kotakapri and Laamanen (2010) used Finnish data and found that high 
expenditure in public health care has a positive influence on citizens‟ life satisfaction. 
Second, the public choice theory is considered a promising method for analyzing the 
relationship between government size and happiness (Frey & Stutzer, 2010) 2 . 
Politicians and bureaucrats are assumed to be mainly self-serving. In real conditions, 
the cost of acquiring information regarding government activity is very high. As a 
consequence, citizens are unable to adequately obtain official government information 
concerning, for instance, the cost function of public goods. Therefore, there is 
information asymmetry between citizens and politicians. Under this condition, 
politicians aim to maximize their re-election probability by favoring small special 
interest groups rather than by maximizing the citizens‟ welfare. Thus, citizens lacking 
information cannot criticize the government for not fulfilling the policy to maximize 
citizens‟ welfare. In contrast, bureaucrats have an incentive to expand budgets for the 
purpose of increasing their prestige and power (Niskanen, 1971). As a consequence, 
                                                   
1 These studies examine how public sectors affect the happiness of citizens (Helliwell, 
J.F., 2006; Helliwell & Huang, 2008;Layard, 2006).   
2 Bureaucratic rent and decentralization are considered to be determinants of life 
satisfaction (Luechinger et al., 2006; Bjørnskov et al., 2008 b). 
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government size becomes larger than the optimal size that would benefit a country‟s 
citizens. Therefore, government size is thought to be negatively associated with citizens‟ 
happiness. Bjørnskov et al. (2007) used cross-country data to show that government size 
decreases life satisfaction, supporting the public choice view3.  
Since the 1990s, local government ordinances regarding the disclosure of official 
government information have been in operation in some areas of Japan. Thus, citizens 
can obtain local government official information if they request its disclosure. As a 
consequence, information asymmetry between local government and citizens has 
decreased in localities where the ordinance was enacted. However, some local 
governments have not enacted these ordinances and so the degree of information 
asymmetry varies between local governments. Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) 
include a question regarding respondents‟ place of residence and degree of happiness, 
and are therefore able to match individual-level JGSS data with localities that enacted 
the disclosure of official government information ordinance, as well as local government 
size. Accordingly, this data enables the examination of the degree of information 
asymmetry and local government size, and their effect on citizens‟ happiness4.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Features of Japanese local 
government are briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the data and methods 
used. Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers 
concluding observations. 
 
2. Review of information disclosure and hypothesis 
 
2.1. Disclosure of official government information ordinance 
The disclosure of the official information ordinance was enacted in the late 1990s to 
ensure government accountability in certain municipalities (Jiyukokuminsha, 2009). 
This ordinance guarantees the right to access information held by the municipality. 
Under this ordinance, a municipality is obliged to disclose information if a citizen 
requests its disclosure. For instance, the process to appoint a supplier of public services 
can be disclosed. Citizens now can, and do, investigate possible collusion between 
politicians, bureaucrats, and private firms, and obtain information regarding the cost 
                                                   
3 Di Tella & MacCulloch (2005) do not believe there is any association between 
government size and happiness after controlling for unobserved fixed effects for each 
country. 
4 A number of previous studies link individual happiness (or life satisfaction) and 
conditions in the respondents‟ country (Alesina et al., 2004; Bjørnskov et al., 2008a; 
2008b; Helliwell, 2003). Hessami (2010) links municipal level data to individual 
happiness using Finnish data. 
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functions of public goods. A municipality is the lowest level of local government. In 2003, 
there were 3,213 municipalities in Japan‟s 47 prefectures 5 ; approximately 68 
municipalities per prefecture. The rate of municipalities instituting a disclosure of 
official information ordinance is increasing rapidly, with approximately 89% of 
ordinances introduced in 20036.  
 
2.2. Testable hypothesis 
 
The amount of information collected by government for administrative purposes is 
distinctly greater than that available to citizens. Such information asymmetry between 
government and citizens strongly tempts politicians and bureaucrats to place higher 
priority on their own profit than on citizens‟ welfare, resulting in various undesired 
outcomes for society as a whole. Disclosure of official information ordinances reduces 
the cost of acquiring information regarding government activities. Enactment of the 
ordinances appears to have alleviated the information asymmetry between government 
and citizens, enabling citizens to know how and the extent to which public spending is 
used to increase benefits for them. Once citizens can access the information, they are 
likely to criticize the policy for advancing politicians‟ and bureaucrats‟ self-interest. 
Therefore, budget allocations have become more efficient, resulting in an increase in 
citizens‟ welfare. Citizens are usually interested in the extent to which they can enjoy 
public services, and they are also interested in whether the supply of public services is 
conducted fairly. Both policy outcomes and procedural utility appear to have an 
influence on citizens‟ happiness (Frey & Stutzer, 2005). It is very important that people 
are treated with equality by government (Dworkin, 1977). Inevitably, selective public 
services, which are provided to individuals only after an individual needs test (but this 
test is not sufficiently open), are problematic from the viewpoint of procedural justice 
(Kumlin and Rothestein, 2005). Thus, information asymmetry exists between 
government and individuals, leaving bureaucrats to use their discretion in the 
allocation of test-based programs. Consequently, the selection process is under suspicion 
of cheating, arbitrariness, favoritism, and discrimination. For instance, government 
provides unemployment relief at the expense of workers via income redistribution. 
However, unemployment relief induces individuals to have incentive to become the 
unemployed. In these circumstances, the right to request the disclosure of official 
                                                   
5 A Japanese prefecture is roughly the equivalent of a state within the United States or 
a province in Canada. 
6 See http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/2008/080801_1.html (accessed 
August 10, 2010). 
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government information that has not been concealed reduces citizens‟ suspicions 
regarding the selection process. Therefore, apart from those who are selected to enjoy 
public services, citizens will feel happy because of the right to request disclosure of 
official government information. These considerations lead to the advancement of 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Disclosure of government information is positively related to the 
happiness of workers but not of non-workers.  
 
Governments can alleviate economic inequality among citizens via income 
redistribution. Therefore, low-income earners are the main beneficiaries under a large 
government (Hessami, 2010). The living standards of non-workers can be improved by 
the redistribution of wealth, making non-workers feel happier at the expense of the 
workers‟ burden. In contrast, workers are less likely to be beneficiaries. A beneficiary of 
a public service, such as a non-worker, is thought to enjoy government activities even if 
government size is greater than the optimal size for society as a whole. Nevertheless, in 
regard to workers, the benefit of a large government does not outweigh the cost. 
Accordingly, there might be no positive association between government size and 
workers‟ happiness. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Government size is positively related to the happiness of non-workers 
but not of workers.  
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
This paper uses individual-level JGSS data. JGSS surveys adopted a two-step 
stratified sampling method and were conducted throughout Japan in 2003. JGSS was 
designed as the Japanese counterpart to the General Social Survey in the United States. 
The survey asked standard questions regarding the characteristics of individuals and 
their families via face-to-face interviews. The data provides information related to 
prefecture of residence, marital and demographic (age and gender) status, level of 
household income, years of schooling, occupation, and degree of happiness7.  
                                                   
7 The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and conducted at the 
Institute of Regional Studies at Osaka University of Commerce, in collaboration with 
the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo, under the direction of Ichiro 
TANIOKA, Michio NITTA, Hiroki SATO, Noriko IWAI, and with Minae OSAWA as 
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The survey collected data from 1,957 adults aged between 20 and 89 years. This 
paper deals with the various individual characteristics noted above. Some respondents 
did not respond to all questions and so the observations used for the estimations were 
reduced. As shown in Table 2, the total sample size of both non-workers and workers 
used for the estimations was 1,291. When the respondents were restricted to those aged 
between 25 and 65 years, the size of the sample was reduced to 956. The non-workers 
sample size of 536 was reduced to 267 respondents, which implies that many 
respondents did not have work because they were retired. The variables used for 
regression estimations are shown in Table 1. Table 1 columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) report 
simple averages, standard deviations, maximum values, minimum values, respectively, 
using all samples. Columns (5) and (6) show simple averages using the workers sample 
and non-workers sample, respectively. The average years of schooling for the workers 
sample was 12.6, which is greater than that for the non-workers; this indicates that 
people who are highly educated are more likely to work. The average age for workers 
was 47 years, approximately 13 years less than that of non-workers. This result reflects 
the fact that non-workers also include retired people. Interestingly, the result for 
marital status is almost identical between workers and non-workers. 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
As a crucial dependent variable of happiness, all respondents were asked, “Are you 
happy?”. The possible responses to this question ranged from 1 (unhappy) to 5 (happy). 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the degree of happiness and shows that the most 
common response was 3. A distinctly larger number of respondents answered „5 (happy)‟ 
than answered „1 (unhappy)‟. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
As explained above, data regarding respondents‟ prefectures of residence were 
available, enabling individual-level data to be matched with prefecture level data. The 
prefecture level data used in this paper includes the number of municipalities that 
enacted the disclosure of official government information ordinance, government size, 
and Gini coefficients. The degree of disclosure of government information is measured 
                                                                                                                                                     
project manager. The project is financially assisted by a Gakujutsu Frontier Grant from 
the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology for the 
2000–2003 academic years, and the datasets are compiled and distributed by SSJ Data 
Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social 
Science, the University of Tokyo.  
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by the number of municipalities enacting the disclosure ordinance in each prefecture. 
This number is calculated using data provided by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications8. JGSS does not provide information regarding 
the municipality where respondents reside, so respondents‟ happiness cannot be 
matched with their municipality. Therefore, it is impossible to examine directly whether 
the enactment of the disclosure ordinance can influence individual happiness. It is for 
this reason that a second approach was employed, using the number of municipalities 
enacting the ordinance as a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry between 
local government and citizens. The Gini coefficients for income from 1999 were sourced 
from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications9. 
Government size was measured using government expenditure and GDP (Government 
expenditure/GDP) sourced from the Asahi Shimbun newspaper (2008).  
 
3.2. Methods 
 
In line with the discussion above, the estimated function of trust takes the following 
form: 
HAPPY ip = 1 DISCINF p + 2GOVSIZEp + 3GINIp + 4MARRYip + 5MALEip + 
6INCOMip + 7EDUip + 8AGEip + 9WORKip +εip,  
 
where HAPPY represents the degree of happiness from 1 (unhappy) to 5 (happy) for 
individual i and in prefecture p; ‟s represent the regression parameters; and εip 
represents the error term. The definitions of variables are shown in Table 1. 
Theoretically, because of the ordinal nature of the dependent variables, an Ordered 
Probit analysis would be appropriate (Greene, 1997, CH19). Thus, Ordered Probit 
analysis has been used previously in the literature to examine the determinants of 
satisfaction (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2003; Easterlin, 2006; Shields et al., 2009), and is also 
used in this paper to examine the determinants of happiness. 
The effects of key variables in examining Hypotheses 1 and 2 are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 created an expectation that the coefficient sign of DISCINF will be 
positive for workers but not for non-workers. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 anticipated that 
the coefficient sign of GOVSCAL is positive for non-workers but not for workers. 
Control variables similar to those used in previous studies on happiness or life 
                                                   
8 The number calculated as (municipalities that enacted the disclosure of official 
government information ordinance) / (All municipalities). 
9 Gini data at the prefecture level are obtained every five years; as 2003 data is not 
available, data from1999 was used. 
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satisfaction have been included, and are as follows. Economic factors are captured by 
incorporating INCOM and GINI as independent variables10. INCOM is included to 
empirically test the presumption derived from the traditional economic theory that 
individuals gain satisfaction from income. However, the income effect on happiness 
remains open to question because some empirical estimations have suggested that 
income level does not improve happiness due to changes in aspiration levels (Easterlin, 
1995; Frey & Stutzer, 2002). In the United States and European countries, income 
inequality influences the degree of happiness (Alesina et al., 2004).  
Human capital is considered to increase income. If this holds true, human capital 
will improve happiness. However, as suggested previously, income level is already 
controlled. Therefore, EDU should be interpreted as capturing the impact of human 
capital on happiness via other channels. For instance, under the same constraints, more 
educated individuals seem to consume goods with greater efficiency because they can 
more easily access useful information, which is why the anticipated sign of EDU is 
positive. Further, following earlier literature (e.g., Bjørnskov et al., 2008a, 2008b, 
Hessami, 2010), AGE, MARRY, and WORK were included as control variables.  
 
4. Results 
 
Results of the Ordered Probit estimations are shown in Tables 2(a), 2(b), and 3. With 
the exception of Table 2(b), each table shows the estimation results based on the sample 
using all observations in column (1). The error terms for respondents living in the same 
prefecture may correlate because various conditions, such as economic policy, are shared. 
Thus, the standard errors of the coefficients may have a downward bias (Moulton, 1990). 
To control for this bias, robust standard errors were calculated by clustering the 
prefecture feature. z-values were then obtained using cluster–robust standard errors. 
After dividing the total sample into workers and non-workers, estimations were 
conducted to compare workers with non-workers regarding the effects of government 
size on happiness. The results for non-workers are shown in column (2) and those for 
workers are in column (3). As pointed out in the previous section, the average age of 
workers was approximately 13 years less than that of non-workers. Thus, the difference 
                                                   
10 In JGSS, individuals are asked to place themselves into 1 of 19 income groups 
according to annual household income. In this study, it is turned into a continuous 
income measure by using the midpoint of each income interval. The highest income 
group is beyond 23 million yen. To not lose the observations belonging to this group, the 
lower bound for this group was used, that is, 23 million yen. To alleviate the 
measurement error, estimations were also conducted using dummy household incomes, 
and these results are similar to those using continuous variables. 
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in regression results between workers and non-workers may be in part because of a 
generation effect that occurs when regression estimations are conducted separately for 
workers and non-workers. To mitigate this effect, the sample age was restricted to those 
aged between 25 and 65 years and the additional estimations were conducted using this 
sample. The results of all observations of those aged between 25 and 65 years appear in 
column (4). Results of workers and non-workers aged between 25 and 60 years appear 
in columns (5) and (6), respectively.  
Tables 2(a) and 3 present a base line model where INCOM, EDU, and AGE are 
included as continuous variables11. Table 2(a) uses HAPPY as a dependent variable, 
with a range of 1 to 5. Among these 5 responses, “3” should call for careful 
interpretation because it may include a number of respondents who could have 
answered in other categories if other possible responses were included in the 
questionnaire. To alleviate any bias arising from this, an alternative proxy for 
happiness was defined as follows. Values of “3” were considered “neutral” and were 
omitted, so HAPPY values became 1, 2, 4, and 5. Further, “4” and “5” were changed to 
“3” and “4”, resulting in a range for HAPPY as a dependent variable of 1 to 4, as shown 
in Table 3. 
When the coefficient takes a positive sign, the positive change in the independent 
variable decreases the probability of the lower ranked outcome and increases the 
probability of the highest ranked outcome. However, “The marginal effects of the 
regressors on the probability are not equal to the coefficients” (Greene, 1997; p. 927). 
Accordingly, this highlights the difficulty in interpreting coefficients. Instead of 
coefficients, marginal effects can be calculated for each category of dependent variables 
(Greene, 1997; pp. 927–931). Thus, for a closer examination of the estimation results, as 
presented in Table 2(b), the marginal effects of key variables are also reported. For 
example, DISCINF and GOVSIZE in Prob (HAPPY = 1), Prob (HAPPY = 2), Prob 
(HAPPY = 3), Prob (HAPPY = 4), and Prob (HAPPY = 5)12.  
The interpretation of the results for DISCINF and GOVSIZE begin first in Table 2(a), 
and then in Table 2(b). DISCINF produces a positive sign but is not statistically 
significant in column (1). After dividing the sample into workers and non-workers, as 
shown in column (2), DISCINF yields a positive sign for workers, being statistically 
                                                   
11 For a robustness check, estimations of alternative specification were also conducted 
where INCOM, EDU, and AGE were included as dummy variables. Their results are 
similar to the results reported in Tables 2(a) and 3. The results are not exhibited in this 
paper owing to a lack of space. However, the results are available upon request. 
12 The marginal effects of estimations reported in Table 3 are not reported owing to a 
lack of space. However, they are available upon request. 
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significant at the 1% level. In contrast, DISCINF yields a negative sign for non-workers 
despite being statistically insignificant. The results of all samples and workers samples 
do not change when the respondents‟ ages are between 25 and 65 years, but DISCINF 
yields a positive sign for non-workers. These results imply that the disclosure of official 
government information increases workers‟ happiness while it has no effect on the 
happiness of non-workers. With regard to GOVSIZE, its signs are positive in all 
estimations. Columns (1)–(3) show that GOVSIZE yields positive signs and is 
statistically significant for both workers and non-workers. However, column (5) 
indicates that GOVSIZE becomes insignificant for workers when the sample is 
restricted. It can be argued that these results show that larger governments result in 
the increase of non-workers‟ happiness but do not influence the happiness of workers. 
Table 2(b) offers a closer examination of the effects of DISCINF and GOVSIZE. Panels 
(I), (II), and (III) report the marginal effects of DISCINF and GOVSIZE for columns (4), 
(5) and (6), respectively, of Table 2(a). Due to a lack of space, the marginal effects of 
DISCINF and GOVSIZE are shown only with regard to columns (1)–(3) of Table 2(a). 
With respect to workers, shown in panel (II), DISCINF is statistically significant in all 
categories. Further, values for DISCINF were –0.02 and 0.35 in the categories 
“Unhappy” and “Happy”, respectively. This implies that a 1% increase in the rate of the 
disclosure of official government information leads to a reduction in the probability of 
being “Unhappy” by 0.02 percentage points and an increase in the probability of being 
“Happy” by 0.35 percentage points. It is surprising that the marginal effects of 
DISCINF regarding the increase of “Happy” people is approximately 17 times larger 
than for the decrease of “unhappy” people. It follows from this result that the disclosure 
of government information makes a distinctly greater contribution to increasing the 
probability that people become happy than to decreasing the probability that people 
become unhappy. GOVSIZE was not statistically significant in any category. Regarding 
non-workers, panel (III) shows that DISCINF is not statistically significant in any 
category, while GOVSIZE is statistically significant in the categories of “Slightly 
unhappy” and “Happy”. Values for GOVSIZE were –0.24 and 0.81 in the categories of 
“Slightly unhappy” and “Happy”, respectively. This reveals that a 1% increase in 
government size resulted in a reduction in the probability of being “Slightly unhappy” 
by 0.24percentage points and an increase in the probability of being “Happy” by 0.81 
percentage points. This result indicates that government size has a greater effect on 
increasing the probability that people will be happy than on decreasing the probability 
that people will become unhappy. 
 With regard to the control variables exhibited in Table 2(a), GINI yields a positive 
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sign in all estimations and is statistically significant in columns (2), (4) and (5). This 
suggests that income inequality leads people to feel happy, which is not consistent with 
Western countries where income inequality reduces the degree of happiness (Alesina et 
al., 2004). The positive effect of income inequality on happiness might be in part 
because of the tunnel effects suggested by Hirschman (1973). According to Hirschman, 
everybody feels better off if people consider the progression of others as a sign that, in 
turn, they will progress in the future. If this holds true, income inequality is positively 
associated with happiness. The results for the other control variables in the present 
study are similar to those obtained in earlier studies. For instance, the positively 
significant results for MARRY and INCOME are consistent with those found in 
previous works (e.g., Alesina et al., 2004; Bjørnskov et al., 2008a; 2008b; Hessami, 2010). 
The negatively significant sign for MALE is also in agreement with the results of 
previous studies (e.g., Alesina et al., 2004; Bjørnskov et al., 2008a; 2008b; Hessami, 
2010). The results of these previous studies imply that there is no variation among 
countries with regard to the impact of various socio-economic factors on happiness. 
As shown in Table 3, DISCINF yields a significant positive sign for workers, while it 
yields a negative sign for non-workers. GOVSIZE yields a positive sign for all 
estimations and is statistically significant for non-workers but not workers. Overall, the 
results of Table 3 are essentially identical to those in Table 2. The results obtained in 
the present study are consistent with and supportive of the concepts expressed in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Controversy exists regarding the influence of government activities on citizens‟ 
welfare. Government is entrusted to a group of elected representatives. Government 
behaves as a „benevolent dictator ‟ to maximize citizens‟ welfare as it is the role of 
politicians to realize the desires of the entire population. In contrast, politicians can 
seek to promote their own self-interest and therefore aim to be re-elected by promoting 
projects that are favored by special interest groups rather than by citizens as a whole. 
As a consequence, government activity may not maximize citizens‟ welfare. Thus, 
government has a positive impact on the happiness of those who gain benefit from 
government activities, but not on the happiness of the remaining citizens. Disclosure of 
official government information can decrease information asymmetry between 
government and citizens, deterring politicians from self-interest behavior. Accordingly, 
the disclosure of government information is expected to increase the happiness of those 
12 
 
who do not enjoy the benefits of government activities.  
In examining the effect of the disclosure of information and government size, this 
paper matched individual level data with prefecture level data sourced from Japan in 
2003. Using the Ordered Probit estimation, the following were found:  
(1) The disclosure of official information is positively associated with the happiness of 
workers but not that of non-workers.  
(2) Government size has a positive effect on the happiness of non-workers but not 
that of workers. 
The above findings clarify that information asymmetry between government and 
citizens has a positive effect on the happiness of those who bear the expense of public 
services. In contrast, information asymmetry does not affect the happiness of the 
beneficiaries of public services, while government size increases their happiness. Thus, 
the importance of fairness and efficiency differs among „citizens‟, which is in line with 
the public choice theory. The findings of this paper are not incongruent with the 
situation in Finland where high expenditure in public health care increases the citizens‟ 
life satisfaction when local government cannot choose which services to provide and for 
whom (Kotakapri & Laamanen, 2010). Such satisfaction comes from the fact that there 
is no suspicion of cheating, arbitrariness, favoritism, or discrimination in the Finnish 
selection process. Thus, it can be argued that a fair government generally leads to an 
increase in citizens‟ satisfaction levels regarding public service. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics 
Variables Definition (1) 
All 
(2) 
Standard 
deviation 
(3) 
Max 
(4) 
Min 
 (5) 
Worker 
(6) 
Non- 
worker 
 Prefecture level data        
DISCINF 
 
Number of municipalities enacting the disclosure of 
official government information ordinance 
(municipalities which enacted disclosure of official 
government information ordinance)/(All 
municipalities). 
0.92 0.88 1 0.53  0.92 0.92 
GOVSIZE Government size 
(Government expenditure)/(GDP ). 
0.10 0.04 0.24 0.05  0.10 0.10 
GINI Gini coefficient of income in 1999. 
 
0.29 0.13 0.35 0.27  0.29 0.29 
  Individual level data        
HAPPY 
 
The value ranges from 1 (unhappy) to 5 (happy). 3.78 0.96 5 1  3.79 3.77 
MARRY 
 
Marriage dummy, which is 1 if an individual is 
married, or otherwise 0. 
0.29 0.43 1 0  0.74 0.72 
MALE 
 
Male dummy, which is 1 if an individual is male, or 
otherwise 0. 
0.73 0.49 1 0  0.52 0.30 
INCOM 
 
Household income (10 million Yen) 5.73 4.02 2.3 0  6.87 4.17 
EDU 
 
Years of schooling 11.9 2.70 18 6  12.6 11.0 
AGE 
 
Ages 
 
53.0 16.7 89 20  47.0 60.7 
WORK Job dummy, which is 1 if an individual is a worker, or 
otherwise 0. 
0.54 0.49 1 0    
Note: Gini coefficients are available every 5 years and were not available in 2003. Therefore, I used Gini coefficients from 1999. With the 
exception of the Gini coefficients, all variables are at the 2003 value. Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) report simple averages, standard 
deviations, maximum values, and minimum values, using all samples. Columns (5) and (6) exhibit simple averages using the workers 
17 
 
sample and non-workers sample, respectively. Data was collected from the Asahi Shimbun newspaper (2008) and the Statistics Bureau 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (various years). 
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Table 2(a). Ordered Probit Model 
             All ages              Ages 25–65 years 
Variables (1) 
All 
(2) 
Worker 
(3) 
Non-worker 
 (4) 
All 
(5) 
Worker 
(6) 
Non-worker 
DISCINF 
 
 0.64 
(1.35) 
 1.35*** 
(3.10) 
 –0.16 
(–0.20) 
  0.62 
(1.54) 
 1.07** 
(2.35) 
 0.007 
(0.01) 
GOVSIZE 
 
1.81** 
(2.37) 
1.70* 
(1.67) 
2.05* 
(1.73) 
 1.82** 
(2.21) 
1.67 
(1.54) 
2.41* 
(1.65) 
GINI 
 
4.15 
(1.57) 
7.71** 
(2.46) 
0.63 
(0.16) 
 4.71* 
(1.77) 
7.37** 
(2.15) 
0.50 
(0.15) 
MARRY 
 
0.44*** 
(5.72) 
0.53*** 
(4.50) 
0.36*** 
(3.70) 
 0.58*** 
(5.14) 
0.59*** 
(4.55) 
0.42* 
(1.93) 
MALE 
 
–0.14** 
(–2.23) 
–0.01 
(–0.25) 
–0.33*** 
(–3.56) 
 –0.11 
(–1.51) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
–0.47*** 
(–3.19) 
INCOM 
 
 0.41*** 
(4.87) 
 0.39*** 
(3.30) 
 0.48*** 
(3.32) 
  0.39*** 
(4.02) 
 0.38*** 
(3.01) 
 0.36* 
(1.70) 
EDU 
 
 0.02 
(1.64) 
 0.02 
(1.30) 
 0.02 
(0.95) 
  0.04*** 
(2.70) 
 0.02 
(1.31) 
 0.09** 
(2.39) 
AGE 
 
 –0.002 
(–0.95) 
 –0.004 
(–1.63) 
 0.001 
(0.36) 
  –0.007** 
(–2.98) 
 –0.006** 
(–2.05) 
 –0.005 
(–1.18) 
WORK  –0.09 
 (–147) 
    –0.01 
 (–0.13) 
  
Observations 1291 755 536  956 689 267 
Pseudo R 2 0.02 0.03 0.03  0.04 0.04 0.06 
Note. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2(b). Marginal effects of Table 2(a) 
Panel (I)    Workers and non-workers: Marginal effects of Column(4)    
Variables (1) 
Value = 1 
(Unhappy) 
(2) 
Value = 2 
(Slightly 
unhappy) 
(3) 
Value = 3 
(Depends) 
(4) 
Value = 4 
(Modestly 
happy) 
(5) 
Value = 5 
(Happy) 
DISCINF 
 
 –0.01* 
(–1.71) 
 –0.05 
(–1.48) 
 –0.17 
(–1.52) 
 0.03 
(1.42) 
 0.20 
(1.54) 
GOVSIZE 
 
–0.04* 
(–1.94) 
–0.15* 
(–2.22) 
-0.50** 
(–2.22) 
0.09* 
(1.89) 
0.60** 
(2.22) 
Panel (II)     Workers: Marginal effects of Column(5) 
Variables (1) 
Value = 1 
(Unhappy) 
(2) 
Value = 2 
(Slightly 
unhappy) 
(3) 
Value = 3 
(Depends) 
(4) 
Value = 4 
(Modestly 
happy) 
(5) 
Value = 5 
(Happy) 
DISCINF 
 
 –0.02** 
(–2.27) 
 –0.08** 
(–2.18) 
 –0.31** 
(–2.29) 
 0.05** 
(2.08) 
 0.35** 
(2.35) 
GOVSIZE 
 
–0.03 
(–1.38) 
–0.13 
(–1.52) 
–0.48 
(–1.52) 
0.09 
(1.44) 
0.55 
(1.55) 
Panel (III)      Non-workers: Marginal effects of Column(6) 
Variables (1) 
Value = 1 
(Unhappy) 
(2) 
Value = 2 
(Slightly 
unhappy) 
(3) 
Value = 3 
(Depends) 
(4) 
Value = 4 
(Modestly 
happy) 
(5) 
Value = 5 
(Happy) 
DISCINF 
 
 –0.0002 
(–0.01) 
 –0.0007 
(–0.01) 
 –0.001 
(–0.01) 
 0.0003 
(0.20) 
 0.002 
(0.01) 
GOVSIZE 
 
–0.07 
(–1.49) 
–0.24* 
(–1.67) 
–0.60 
(–1.60) 
0.10 
(1.32) 
0.81* 
(1.66) 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3. Ordered Probit Model (excluding “depends” from Happiness) 
             All ages              Ages 25–65 years 
Variables (1) 
All 
(2) 
Worker 
(3) 
Non-worker 
 (4) 
All 
(5) 
Worker 
(6) 
Non-worker 
DISCINF 
 
 0.58 
(1.15) 
 1.66*** 
(2.97) 
 –0.65 
(–0.81) 
  0.44 
(0.75) 
 1.10* 
(1.73) 
 –1.11 
(–0.86) 
GOVSIZE 
 
1.92** 
(2.53) 
1.57 
(1.27) 
2.44* 
(1.78) 
 2.06** 
(2.46) 
1.00 
(0.81) 
4.12* 
(2.15) 
GINI 
 
4.54 
(1.41) 
10.6*** 
(2.99) 
–0.77 
(–0.17) 
 5.60* 
(1.69) 
9.51** 
(2.24) 
–1.63 
(–0.32) 
MARRY 
 
0.46*** 
(3.92) 
0.47** 
(2.34) 
0.50*** 
(3.97) 
 0.65*** 
(3.78) 
0.58*** 
(2.71) 
0.66** 
(2.16) 
MALE 
 
–0.15** 
(–2.14) 
0.06 
(0.64) 
–0.49*** 
(–4.13) 
 –0.05 
(–0.67) 
0.12 
(1.07) 
–0.61*** 
(–3.15) 
INCOM 
 
 0.20* 
(1.76) 
 0.15 
(0.94) 
 0.38** 
(2.00) 
  0.16 
(1.26) 
 0.14 
(0.84) 
 0.21 
(0.82) 
EDU 
 
 0.01 
(0.78) 
 0.01 
(0.74) 
 0.01 
(0.57) 
  0.04* 
(1.90) 
 0.02 
(1.03) 
 0.07 
(1.36) 
AGE 
 
 –0.001 
(–0.56) 
 –0.006 
(–1.56) 
 0.005 
(1.41) 
  -0.005* 
(–1.79) 
 -0.005 
(-1.15) 
 –0.001 
(–0.30) 
WORK  –0.05 
 (–0.66) 
    0.04 
 (0.48) 
  
Observations 860 497 363  641 455 186 
Pseudo R 2 0.02 0.02 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.08 
Note. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
